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Korean Constitutional Court Standing at
the Crossroads: Focusing on Real Cases
and Variational Types of Decisions
JIBONG LIM*
I. INTRODUCTION
There is not a country in the world without some form of a
Constitution. Constitutions necessarily protect fundamental rights
by regulating potentially intrusive governmental powers. When
governmental intrusion is unwarranted, Constitutional
adjudication often serves an indispensable role as a safeguard to
people's rights.
The Korean Constitutional Court, which is separate from the
general courts, was established in 1988 to protect fundamental
rights.1 It was not, however, the first constitutional adjudication
institution in Korea.2 In the past, the Constitutional Committee
and the Korean Supreme Court served this function, albeit
ineffectively.3 Between 1948 and 1988, only ten cases received
judicial review and only three laws were ruled unconstitutional.
4
* Professor of Law, Konkuk University (Seoul/Korea). LL.B. 1990, Seoul Nat'l University;
LL.M. 1993, Seoul Nat'l University; LL.M. 1996, U.C. Berkeley School of Law; J.S.D.
1999, U.C. Berkeley School of Law. I would like to thank Professor Martin M. Shapiro
and Professor John Choon Yoo at U.C. Berkeley School of Law for their extremely
helpful comments and insightful suggestions in writing this paper. All errors made in this
piece, however, are my own. This paper was supported by Konkuk University in 2001.
1. James M. West & Dae-Kyu Yoon, The Constitutional Court of the Republic of
Korea: Transforming the Jurisprudence of the Vortex?, 40 Am. J. Comp. L. 73, 75 (1992).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. See DAE-KyU YOON, LAW AND POLITICAL AUTHORITY IN SOUTH KOREA 154-
71 (IFES Korean Studies Series No. 2, 1990). For specific references to the ten cases, and
other related information on the Korean Constitutional Court, see The Constitutional
Court of Korea, The Ten Years of the Korean Constitutional Court, at
http://www.ccourt.go.kr (last visited Apr. 21, 2002) [hereinafter Constitutional Court of
Korea Website].
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Fortunately, the present Korean Constitutional Court takes a
more active role in developing constitutional law having declared
many significant laws unconstitutional.
5
The Korean Constitutional Court has been the target of
antagonism from competing branches within the Korean
government because of its "judicial activism." 6 It has clashed not
only with the Korean Legislative and Executive branches, but also
with the Supreme Court over jurisdictional issues.7 Continuous
conflict with the other branches of government threatens its
continued development and, possibly, its very existence. 8
This article explores why the Korean Constitutional Court is
the target of criticism by the other branches of government and
suggests a solution to resolve the conflict. This article compares
the Korean Constitutional Court to both the United States
Supreme Court and the German Federal Constitutional Court, for
the Korean Court has adopted many attributes of these two
systems.9 The histories of these two respective courts provide
insight on how to resolve the conflicts facing the Korean
Constitutional Court.
Solutions to the problems facing the Korean Constitutional
Court, however, cannot be found solely by examining the history
and development of the U.S. Supreme Court and the German
Federal Constitutional Court. The Korean Court has its own
distinct peculiarities as derived from Korean society and culture.
To better understand the law of another culture, one must
5. West & Yoon, supra note 1, at 103-04. Since the Constitutional Court was
established in Sept. 1988, it received 6,240 cases and, as of Nov. 30, 2000, disposed of 5,739
cases. Constitutional Court of Korea Website, supra note 4. Among the 5,739 cases, the
Court decided 3,297 cases in the full bench by dismissing 2,156 cases in the screening
process of small benches and concerned parties withdrew the other 239 cases. Id. Of 276
cases in which the constitutionality of law was reviewed, the court rendered 259 judgments
on the merits. Id. Among those, sixty-five laws were declared unconstitutional either in
whole or in part. Id. Thus, approximately twenty-five percent of these judgments resulted
in the invalidation or partial repudiation of law. Id.
6. See Dai-Kwon Choi, Hangug Hunbubjaepansoeu Jungchihag-Gujowa Gineunguer
Jungsimeuro [The Politics of the Constitutional Court: Centering Around Its Structure and
Function], 91 SEOUL NAT'L U. JURISPRUDENCE 106, 106-07, 112-13, 115-16 (1993); see
also Moon-Hyun Kim, Hunbubjaepansowa Daebubwon Gwangei [The Relationship
between the Korean Constitutional Court and Korean Supreme Court], in
HUNBUBJAEPANEUI IRONGWA SILJE [THEORY AND REALITY OF CONSTITUTIONAL
ADJUDICATION] 79-107 (Bakyungsa 1993) [hereinafter Moon-Hyun Kim].
7. Moon-Hyun Kim, supra note 6, at 145, 154-56.
8. Id.
9. Id.
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appreciate the systemic and substantive particularities of that
culture. As long as the law remains a means for justice in
accordance with a society's ideals, these ideals must become a part
of the analysis.
Thus, a study of the Korean Constitutional Court requires an
awareness that many aspects of Korean law are founded not only
in Western ideals of egalitarianism and democracy, but in the
deeply rooted Confucian tradition of hierarchy and authority.10 A
comparison of the Eastern legal system to its Western influences
requires a high degree of knowledge about the social, political and
cultural differences between the two. Without this, the study is
likely to result in judgments and conclusions based on irrelevant
values.
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
A. General Overview
Initially, the Korean legal system was similar to the Roman-
German system of law.11 As such, the Korean legal system can be
classified as a system of civil law that was deeply influenced by
other civil law countries.
During the Japanese occupation from 1910-1945, Koreans
began to incorporate Western legal theories into their system.
12
While under Japanese control, Korea adopted the Japanese legal
system, which was itself modeled after the German legal system.
13
After Korea's emancipation from Japan, many Korean legal
scholars focused their studies on the German legal system because
it most closely resembled the system they had adopted.
14
Eventually, however, the focus on Korean legal studies
shifted and began to incorporate theories of the United States
10. See Byoung Ho Park, Traditional Korean Society and Law, 5 KOREAN J. COMP. L.
1,3 (1977).
11. See G. RADBRUCH, VORSCHULE DER RECHTSPHILOSOPHIE 51 (1948).
12. See Park, supra note 10, at 1; Chongko Choi, On the Reception of Western Law in
Korea, 9 KOREAN J. COMP. L. 141, 158-67 (1981). Some may disagree with this assertion,
but note that Park uses moderate expressions, such as "in a sense" and "on a full scale."
See Park, supra note 10, at 167 (providing an in-depth analysis).
13. See Chan An Kim, Korean Attitudes Toward Law, 10 PAC. RIM L. & POL'Y J. 1, 7-
8 (2000).
14. Chongko Choi, History of German-Korean Relationship Through Legal Science,
in 2 RECHT IN DEUTSCHLAND UND KOREA 83, 96-112 (1980).
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legal system. 15 This shift began when large numbers of U.S.
educated Korean individuals returned home and contributed to
the formation of the Korean Constitution.16 The presence of the
U.S. military also seems to have had a profound effect on the
development of the Constitution. During that period, Korea
adopted the U.S. precedent-based system of judicial review. 17
Since then, the effect of U.S. Constitutional law and that of other
European civil law countries has continued to influence the
Korean legal systems.
18
The Korean Constitutional Court of the Sixth Republic of
Korea (1987-present) adjudicates constitutional issues, much like
the U.S. Supreme Court.' 9  In short, the present Korean
Constitutional Court is a blend of the constitutional adjudication
principles embodied in the institutions of Germany and the United
States.
B. Influence of Korea's Historical and Political Background in the
Adoption of the Constitutional Court System
Korea's historical and political background also played an
important role in the development of the Constitutional Court
15. Hyo-Jeon Kim, The Effect of American Judicial Review on Korea, in THE U.S.
CONSTITUTION AND KOREAN CONSTITUTION 339-40 (1989) [hereinafter Hyo-Jeon Kim].
16. See DONG SUH BARK, THE AMERICAN-EDUCATED ELITE IN KOREAN SOCIETY:
KOREA AND THE U.S.-A CENTURY OF COOPERATION 263 (1984). The number of
Koreans educated in the United States grew dramatically after the Korean War. Id.
17. S. KOREA CONST. art. 111, § 4; see also Hyo-Jeon Kim, supra note 15, at 339-40.
18. Hyo-Jeon Kim, supra note 15, at 144.
19. Up to now, Korea has had six republics with nine revisions of its constitutional
laws. YOUNG-SUNG KWON, HUNBUBHAK WONLON [CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: A
TEXTBOOK] 1144-46 (rev. ed. 1994). Within constitutional adjudication institutions, some
changes occur along with the changes to the republic. Id. The First Republic had a
Constitutional Committee, which was composed of the vice president (who served as its
head), five supreme court judges and five congressmen. Id. The Committee's character
was a blending of a constitutional court and political organization styles. Id. The Second
Republic established a Korean Constitutional Court that mainly imitated the German
Constitutional Court system. Id. It consisted of nine judges, of which three were selected
each by the president, supreme court and senate. Id. The court itself, however, was not
actually established, due to a military overthrow in 1961. Id. The Third Republic had an
Impeachment Committee, which was composed of the chief justice of the supreme court
(who served as head), three supreme court justices and five congressmen. Id. The Fourth
and Fifth Republics also had a Constitutional Committee, but the selection of justices was
different from the procedures of the First Republic and rather similar to those of the
Constitutional Court of the Second Republic. Id. The Sixth Republic established the
Korean Constitutional Court, which is nearly same with that of Second Republic in its
composition except that the Senate has been changed to the National Assembly. Id.
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system. During the public hearings for the 1980 Constitution, the
majority supported implementation of the U.S. system of judicial
review for the general court. 20 Some, however, called for a revival
of the short-lived Constitutional Court of the Second Republic,
and a few advocated the adoption of the Constitutional
Committee. 21 The return of the Constitutional Committee, in
existence during the Fourth Republic from 1972-1980, was not a
popular option because it did not make a single constitutionality
decision during its term.
22
During the Third Republic of Korea (1963-1972) a movement
began to change the judicial system. Extensive proposals were
introduced to reform the entire judicial structure.23 It was hoped
that the reforms, including the restoration of judicial review, would
result in a "consolidation of constitutionalism." 24 As the drafting
of the constitutional amendment began, proposals influenced by
the U.S. system were introduced to restore the power of judicial
review to the Korean Supreme Court.25 The resulting judicial
structure, however, seemed to be more like the Japanese system.
The sitting Korean Supreme Court of the Third Republic was
called on to review the constitutionality of the amendment.
26
Faced with the possibility of resolving highly controversial
constitutional issues, the majority of the Korean Supreme Court
Justices did not support the proposed expansion of their duties to
include judicial review. 27 The Court was reluctant to acquiesce to
the proposal that they should make constitutional determinations
because most of the Justices were opposed to judicial activism.
The Justices strongly objected to this active role of the judiciary
found in common law systems.
28
Upon returning to Korea after studying in Europe, a number
of influential Korean constitutional law scholars proposed a
20. YOON, supra note 4, at 168.
21. Id.
22. See Constitutional Court of Korea Website, supra note 4.
23. See Dae-Kyu Yoon, New Developments in Korean Constitutionalism, PAC. RIM
L. & POL'Y J. 395, 407 (1995) [hereinafter Yoon, New Developments].
24. Id.
25. See West & Yoon, supra note 1, at 76.
26. Id.
27. Id. As Professor J. H. Merryman observed: "The tendency has been for the civil
law judge to recoil from the responsibilities and opportunities of constitutional
adjudication." JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN, THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION 139 (2d. ed.
1985).
28. West & Yoon, supra note 1, at 77.
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system of judicial review based on German models, which were
examined as alternatives to the U.S. system.29 These models were
called the "constitutional court system." 30
In response to calls for increased democratic order and
reform of judicial review procedures, the modem Constitutional
Court system was adopted during the Sixth Republic in the 1988
Constitutional amendments. The Constitutional Court replaced
the Constitutional Committee, which had been established during
the Fourth Republic.31 The Korean government has not made the
transcripts of the deliberations during the drafting of the
amendment publicly available. Therefore, it is not known exactly
why and how the Constitutional Court plan was adopted. What
can be inferred as a result of the deliberations is that the
Constitutional Court first adopted in the 1960 Constitution was
restored. While it is still too early to make an accurate evaluation
of this system, one can speculate that a more powerful
Constitutional Court may be more suitable under the present
political conditions. 32
Based upon available materials, it appears that the adoption
of the Constitutional Court system was the result of a political
compromise rather than a conclusion that the German
Constitutional Court system is superior. Close scrutiny of Korean
Constitutional Amendments 111, 112 and 113 reveal signs of a
political deal wherein six representatives from the three political
parties met and deliberated. 33 During the deliberations, the
opposition party likely insisted on the Constitutional Court system
due to the failure of the previous Constitutional Committee. The
majority party appears to have agreed and compromised on the
Constitutional Court system in exchange for concessions from the
opposition party on other issues.
29. Id. Professor Cheol-Soo Kim at Seoul Nat'l University and Professor Young Huh
at Yonsei University could be leading examples. Id.
30. See generally id., at 74-77 (describing details on how the two alternatives, the
American system and the German Constitutional Court system, were set forth in Korea).
31. See Yoon, New Developments, supra note 23, at 408-09.
32. In the past, the Constitutional Committee played a nominal role and existed more
in name than reality. The ordinary court, given the job of judicial review under the 1962
Constitution, was overly politicized. See generally YOON, supra note 4 (providing details of
the history of judicial review in Korea).
33. See S. KOREAN CONST. arts. 111-13.
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III. POWER OF THE KOREAN CONSTITUTIONAL COURT
The organization and legal authority of the Korean
Constitutional Court are generally enumerated in the Korean
Constitution. 34 Article 111, Sections 2, 3 and 4, and Article 112
describe the Court's organization and composition. 35 Article 3,
Section 1 and Article 113 discuss the authority of the Court.36 In
addition, the Constitutional Court Act passed in August of 1988,
supplements and details the specifics of the organization and
authority of the Court3 7 .
The organization of the Korean Constitutional Court is
influenced by the U. S. judicial system.38 The scope of the Court's
legal authority, however, is more akin to the German Federal
Constitutional Court system.
39
The current Korean Constitutional Court is more powerful
than the Fourth and Fifth Republics' Constitutional Committee.
40
34. Id.
35. Id. This commentary does not deal with the organization and composition of
Korean Constitutional Court, but focuses on the competence of Korean Constitutional
Court to examine its role in the Korean Government.
36. S. KOREA CONST. art. 113.
37. Constitutional Court Act, arts. 3, 12 (1988) (amended 1997) (S. Korea). The
Constitutional Court Act, established on August 5, 1988, consists of seventy-six articles
and additional rules. Id. It is divided into five chapters: Ch. 1, General Provisions; Ch. 2,
Organization; Ch. 3, General Decision Procedure; Ch. 4, Special Decision Procedure; and
Ch. 5, Punitive Provisions. Id.
38. See infra, Part II.
39. See infra, Part II.
40. See generally Constitutional Court Act. The Constitution of the First Republic
gave the power of concrete judicial review to the Constitutional Committee. See YOON,
supra note 4, at 152-56. The Constitution of the Second Republic gave the Constitutional
Court jurisdiction in controversies concerning the final interpretation of the Constitution,
the unconstitutionality of legal provisions, jurisdictional disputes between governmental
organizations, political party dissolution, and impeachment and election cases for the
President, the Chief Justice and the Justices. Id. at 156-58. Under the Constitution of the
Third Republic, the Impeachment Committee took charge of impeachment decisions and
political party dissolution, and the general courts were given the power of judicial review
of administrative ordinance regulations and election cases. KWON, supra note 19, at 96.
The Constitution of the Fourth Republic established the Constitutional Committee, which
had jurisdiction over concrete judicial review, the decision of impeachment and the
decision of political party dissolution. YOON, supra note 4, at 164-67. The Constitution of
the Fifth Republic gave the power of concrete judicial review, the decision of
impeachment and the decision of political party dissolution, and the power of judicial
review of administrative ordinances regulations and election cases were given to the
general courts. See id. at 164-68. In the Fourth and Fifth Republics, the Supreme Court,
however, could decide whether to forward the case to the Constitutional Committee in a
concrete judicial review case, and this produced a negative result in that not even one case
was filed during that period. See id
Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
The Court now has the power of judicial review and impeachment
as well as the power to dissolve a political party, to solve
jurisdictional disputes between governmental agencies and the
power to resolve constitutional complaints.41
A. Concrete Judicial Review
1. Overview
According to German jurisprudence, there are two types of
Constitutional cases reviewed by the Court: (1) concrete norm
control or "konkrete Normenkontrolle" (deciding the
constitutionality of an accepted norm brought to its attention
through a case or conflict), and (2) abstract norm control or
"abstrakte Normenkontrolle" (the Court on its own motion or by
request chooses to review the constitutionality of an accepted
norm). 42
The Constitution limits the right to request abstract norm
control review to those situations expressly granted by the
constitution or by law.43 Concrete norm control, by comparison, is
a form of judicial review similar to the U.S. system, in which
adverse parties bring constitutional challenges before the Court.
41. S. KOREA CONST. art 8, § 4. This section prescribes that if a political party's
purpose or activities are contrary to the fundamental democratic order, the party may be
brought before the Constitutional Court in an action for its dissolution, and it shall be
dissolved if the Constitutional Court so decides. lId
42. Donald P. Komners, German Constitutionalism: A Prolegomenon, 40 EMORY L.J.
837, 841 (1991). Concrete norm control is again divided into the general court type and
the constitutional court type. See id. at 840. In the general court type, when the norm is
determined unconstitutional, the court does not apply it to the pending case, nor does the
court repeal the norm. Id. at 837-41. Rather, the norm continues to be effective until the
legislature abrogates it. Id. Therefore, the norm is still in effect except with respect to the
parties of the case;. Id. In the meantime, in the constitutional court type, the norm that is
declared unconstitutional loses its effect upon the declaration. Id.
43. See id. Abstract norm control is usually performed in a designated constitutional
institution such as a constitutional court, which is completely independent of the general
courts. See id. In France, Conseil Constitutionnel [Constitutional Council] does abstract
norm control. See HENRY ABRAHAM, THE JUDICIAL PROCESS: AN INTRODUCTORY
ANALYSIS OF THE COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES, ENGLAND AND FRANCE 310 (5th
ed. 1986). It is a special judicial body that is charged with review of the constitutionality of
legislation before its promulgation. Id. at 311. The Constitutional Council must pass on
the constitutionality of so-called organic laws and the parliamentary rules of procedure.
Id. It may be called upon to review the constitutionality of simple laws including laws
approving the ratification of treaties, if such review is requested by the President of the
Republic, the Prime Minister, the President of the Assembly, the President of the Senate
or sixty deputies or sixty senators. Id.
[Vol. 24:327
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This theory of judicial review was developed in the U.S. in the
Supreme Court decision Marbury v. Madison.44 The U.S. system
of judicial review later influenced the legal systems of other
countries, including Germany.
45
While the Korean judicial review system models the U.S.
system, there are some evident German influences. 46 For example,
as in Germany, a Korean law that is deemed unconstitutional is
completely invalidated and is known as a "general effect
decision." 47 Similarly, the principle of stare decisis in the United
States, where each constitutional decision creates a precedent to
be followed in subsequent decisions, ultimately has the same effect
as a general effect decision in Korea. 48
Alternatively, in cases where there was no need for the
complete nullification of a law, the Koreans adopted the German
legal theory of "variational decisions." 49 A sudden declaration of
nullity in these circumstances could undermine faith in the entire
44. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 138, 177-78 (1803). Although there is an opinion that
article 3, section 2 (1) of the U.S. Constitution is the provisional foundation for judicial
review of federal laws by the U.S. Supreme Court, the prevailing view states that all
judicial review was established decisively by the Chief Justice Marshall's decision in
Marbury v. Madison. See Rocco. J. TRESOLINI, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 67
(2d ed. 1959).
45. Id. at 841.
46. See generally Seung Wha Chang, The Role of Law in Economic Development and
Adjustment Process: The Case of Korea, 34 INT'L LAW 267,276 (2000).
47. Kwon, supra note 19, at 1082-83. Article 47 of the Korean Constitutional Court
Act states that a law or legal provision declared to be unconstitutional loses its effect.
Constitutional Court Act, art. 47 (1988) (amended 1997) (S. Korea). The point of time
when the provision loses its effect is different between Korea and Germany. In Germany,
the unconstitutional provision becomes naturally void from the beginning by ex-tunc
Wirkung. See Gesetz uber das Bundesverfassungsgericht (Bundesverfassungsgerichts-
Gesetz, BVerfGG) [German Federal Constitutional Court Act] arts. 76-78, v. 11.8.1993
(BGBI. I S.1473). In Korea, however, the unconstitutional provision, unless a criminal law
provision, loses its force from the day of ruling "against the Constitution." See
Constitutional Court Act, art. 47.
48. See TRESOLINI supra note 44, at 64-67. In the United States, the fact that general
effect is not directly admitted is closely related to the logic of justification for judicial
review. Id. Since the U.S. Constitution does not specifically authorize judicial review, the
power of the Supreme Court to declare laws unconstitutional is implied from its general
power to hear cases and controversies. See id. Thus, as a matter of pure logic, the Court's
decision that an act of government is unconstitutional can only be relevant to the outcome
of the case before the Court.
49. West & Yoon, supra note 1, at 99-100.
20021 335
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Constitution. Therefore, the temporary reservation of a nullity
declaration may be used to protect legal stability.50
The theory of variational decisions began in German common
law. There are three types of variational decisions: (1) the
Decision of Limited Constitutionality, (2) the Decision of
Disagreement with the Constitution and (3) the Decision of
Urging Legislation.51 A Decision of Limited Constitutionality
allows a judge to avoid nullifying a law by broadly construing the
Constitution. 52 A Decision of Disagreement with the Constitution
allows a judge to leave a legal norm found unconstitutional in
force temporarily to avoid a legal vacuum. 53 The Decision of
Urging Legislation allows a judge to announce that, even though a
norm may be constitutional at the time of review, it may be held
unconstitutional after the decision. 54 The judge, however, can only
urge legislators to revise or replace the norm in order to prevent it
from being declared unconstitutional in the future.
55
The variational types of decisions have no corresponding legal
or constitutional provisions, so the Korean Constitutional Court
adopted them through the precedent of the German Federal
Constitutional Court. 56 The Korean Court uses variational
decisions when faced with sensitive issues that could cause serious
disruptions to economic or social order.
57
2. Application of Variational Decisions
As discussed above, there are three types of variational
decisions: Decisions of Limited Constitutionality, Decisions of
Disagreement with the Constitution and Decisions of Urging
Legislation.58 Each is used to avoid a constitutional crisis, but the
resulting decisions have different effects.
50. See Korean Const. Ct., Res. of Apr. 2, 1990, 89 KCC Ga 113; see also Korean
Const. Ct., Res. of Sept. 8, 1984, 1 KCCR 199.
51. KWON, supra note 19, at 1094.
52. Id. at 1097.
53. Id. at 1095.
54. Id. at 1097.
55. See Choi, supra note 6, at 166-67.
56. See West & Yoon, supra note 1, at 99.
57. See id. at 99-100.
58. KWON, supra note 19, at 1094.
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a. Decisions of Limited Constitutionality
Recognizing that limited constitutional interpretations are
common in many countries where theories of constitutional
adjudication are firmly settled, the Korean Constitutional Court
embraced the theory of Decisions of Limited Constitutionality.
59
Under this approach, the Court first assumes that a law is
constitutional.60 Then if the language of the law is vague or
ambiguous, the law is construed to be in compliance with
constitutional principles.61 As a result, the Korean Constitutional
Court avoids completely nullifying a vague law based on the
unconstitutionality of some its provisions. 62 The Court reasons
that this approach minimizes legal uncertainties and "unpleasant
surprise" 63 that occur when positive and constitutional provisions
are nullified along with unconstitutional provisions under a
complete nullification approach.
An example of a Decision of Limited Constitutionality is the
Court's ruling on the National Security Act in 1990.64 The Korean
Constitutional Court interpreted the Act's language broadly in
order to find the Act constitutional. 65 Hence, the Court avoided a
complete nullification of the Act by using a Decision of Limited
Constitutionality. Specifically, in upholding the National Security
Act, the Court reasoned that the words "praise," "activity,"
"alignment," "other methods" and "benefiting" located in the
"Praise and Encouragement Crime" article were open to many
59. See MYUNGSUN YOON & BYUNG-MOOK KIM, HUNBUBCHAEGERON
[CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEM THEORY] 36-37 (Seoul: Bubjisa, 1998); see also Korean Const.
Ct. Res. of Feb. 25, 1992, 89 KCC Ga 104.
60. Korean Const. Ct., Res. of Feb. 25, 1992, 89 KCC Ga 104.
61. KWON, supra note 19, at 1098.
62. Korean Const. Ct., Res. of Feb. 25, 1992, 89 KCC Ga 104.
63. Id.
64. Korean Const. Ct., Res. of Apr. 2, 1990, 89 KCC Ga 113. Article 7, Section 1, of
the National Security Act states that any person who praises, encourages, propagandizes,
or aligns with an anti-state organization's activities, the organization's members and
anyone who receives instruction from the organization and who possesses knowledge of
endangering national security or threatening fundamental democratic order, or agitates
for governmental overthrow, shall be punished by up to seven years imprisonment.
Section 5 states that someone who produces, possesses, or transports or distributes
materials for the purpose of committing acts outlined in Section 1, above, shall also be
punished by a maximum of seven years in prison. National Security Act, art. 7, §§ 1, 5
(1988) (S. Korea).
65. Korean Const. Ct., Res. of Apr. 2, 1990, 89 KCC Ga 113.
20021
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interpretations. 66 Because the words had ambiguous meanings,
the Court upheld the Act in its entirety.
In holding that the Act was constitutional, the Korean
Constitutional Court may have caused negative effects in other
areas of Korean politics and criminal justice. First, the Court's
decision allows arbitrary application of the Act by law
enforcement authorities. 67  Second, the Court's broad
interpretation has far-reaching consequences to the rights of
freedom of speech, education and the arts. Finally, the Court's
broad interpretation allows criminal punishment to be extended to
cases where there is no clear danger to the nation's security,
existence or fundamental democratic order.6
8
While the Court's decision appears to conflict with Korea's
Constitution and legislative policy, the Court believed that
complete nullification was a worse option because it could have
potentially caused a legal vacuum and disorder. 69 In addition, the
war between North and South Korea was factored into the Court's
decision. The importance of constitutional consistency in the face
of political unrest tipped the balance in favor of a broad
interpretation of the Act and a decision to uphold its
constitutionality. 70 The Court found that the preamble of the
Constitution allowed the Court to uphold laws with vague and
potentially unconstitutional terms or provisions when they do not
threaten Korea's very existence, national security or fundamental
democratic order.
71
Another application of the Decision of Limited
Constitutionality surely would have led to a better result. By
narrowly interpreting the Constitution to define and interpret
vague provisions of Article 7, Section 1 and Section 5 of the
National Security Act, the Court could have resolved
constitutional inconsistencies without completely nullifying the
law.72 This approach would preserve substantial individual
66. IaM See also National Security Act, art. 7, § 1 (1988) (S. Korea).
67. Id.
68. Korean Const. Ct., Res. of Apr. 2,1990,89 KCC Ga 113.
69. See Constitutional Court of Korea Website, supra note 4.
70. See id.
71. See S. KOREA CONST. art. 37, § 2 which states that the citizens' freedoms and
rights may be restricted by law only when necessitated by concerns for either national
security, maintaining law and order or for the public's welfare. Even if such restrictions are
imposed, they shall not violate essential aspects of the citizens' freedoms or rights. Id.
72. Korean Const. Ct., Dec. of Apr. 2, 1990,2 KCCR 49.
338 [Vol. 24:327
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freedoms, delineate permitted acts from prohibited acts and limit
law enforcement agencies' use of discretion. 73 In addition, limiting
the scope of punishment by defining ambiguous language of the
Act would leave no room for violation of the principle of nulla
poena sine lege (no punishment without legitimacy, or, without
law, there is no punishment).
74
Applying a new interpretation of the theory of the Decision
of Limited Constitutionality, which alters the Act but does not
completely nullify it, will accomplish the twin Constitutional goals
of protecting national security and pursuing a peaceful unification
based on a fundamental democratic order. Thus, this
interpretation should be imposed.
b. Decisions of Disagreement with the Constitution and Decisions
of Urging Legislation
Similar to the Court's application of Decisions of Limited
Constitutionality, the Court uses both Decisions of Disagreement
with the Constitution and Decisions of Urging Legislation when it
holds a law unconstitutional but believes immediate nullification
of the law could lead to legal instability.75 A Decision of
Disagreement with the Constitution temporarily enables the
continued enforcement of a law. A simultaneous Decision of
Urging Legislation announces to the legislature the likelihood that
the provision will be found unconstitutional in the future and urges
the legislature to revise the unconstitutional part.76 Exercising the
option to delay nullification of the law also serves to preserve a
separation of powers, allowing the Court to interpret the
Constitution while not infringing on the legislature's right to pass
laws.77 As illustrated by the Korean Constitutional Court's
analysis of the National Security Act, the Court here again is able
to balance diverse political, economic and social ideals when
rendering an opinion on a law's constitutionality.
78
For example, upon judicial review of the constitutionality of
Article 33 and Article 34 of the Congressman Election Act, the
73. See id.
74. Kuk Cho, Tension Between the National Security Law and Constitutionalism in
South Korea: Security for What? 15 B.U. INT'L LJ. 125,144-45 (1997).
75. Korean Const. Ct., Res. of Sept. 8, 1989,88 KCC Ga 6.
76. Id.
77. See S. KOREA CONST. arts. 51-65.
78. Cho, supra note 74, at 144-45.
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Court rendered both a Decision of Disagreement with the
Constitution and a Decision of Urging Legislation.79 The Court
reasoned that Article 33, which prescribes that candidates deposit
a high amount of trust money when running in an election, and
Article 34, which reverts the trust money back to the National
Treasury, violate the principle of free election by limiting the
chance of a nonpartisan candidacy.80 Restricting the nonpartisan
candidates' access to trust money had the effect of forcing them to
join a party.81 This is inconsistent with the principle of free
election. 82  Similarly, the Court held that the articles were
incompatible with the principle of sovereignty, which gives
electorates a right to recommend a candidate. 83 Finally, the
articles are unconstitutional because they violate Article 24 of the
Constitution by infringing upon the public's suffrage.
84
Accordingly, Articles 33 and 34 violate the principle of fairness
embodied in the Constitution by allowing political parties to
monopolize the nomination of candidates and blocking
nonpartisan candidates' participation in elections.
85
As required by Article 47, Section 2 of the Korean
Constitutional Court Act, a ruling from the Constitutional Court
that the Articles 33 and 34 were unconstitutional would have
rendered the provisions ineffective from the moment of the
ruling.86 The Korean Constitutional Court, however, rendered a
variational decision. They concluded that the Decision of
Disagreement with the Constitution was allowed for the continued
application of Articles 33 and 34 until May 31, 1991, at which time
Congress was to revise the provisions. 87
79. Korean Const. Ct., Res. of Sept. 8, 1989, 88 KCC Ga 6. The Korean
Constitutional Court held that Articles 33 and 34 of the Congressman Election Act, which
was revised March 17, 1988 as Korean Code 4003, do not comply with the Constitution
and that the provisions will nonetheless continue to be effective until they are required to
be revised on May 31, 1991. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id
85. Id.
86. Korean Const. Court Act, art. 47, § 2. This provision says that a law which is
declared unconstitutional shall become ineffective from the day of its declaration.
Provisions of the penal code, however, become ineffective retroactively. Id.
87. Korean Const. Ct., Res. of Sept. 8, 1984, 1 KCCR 199.
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The Court's application of a variational decision was an
effective way to balance current political and constitutional
concerns. First, the Court's decision acknowledged the
independence of Congress as an organ of representation. 88 It
respected the constitutional principle of separation of powers,
which states that repeals and revision of laws are to be completed
by the legislature.89  Moreover, other provisions of the
Congressman Election Act are dependent on Articles 33 and 34 to
operate. 90 It was necessary for Congress to redraft these provisions
before Articles 33 and 34 were removed.
Second, it appears that using a variational decision regarding
the constitutionality of the Election Act, rather than completely
nullifying it, ensured the homogeneity of Congressional members
by ensuring equality in the election process. 91 The 13th Congress,
elected in the general election of April 26, 1988, was composed of
members who were elected under the prior trust money system of
Articles 33 and 34.92 If the Korean Constitutional Court declared
the trust money system unconstitutional, the provisions would lose
effect immediately. As a result, subsequently elected or reelected
members of Congress would not be restricted by the trust money
provision as their peers were. Thus, in order to preserve equality in
the election method of the 13th Congress, Articles 33 and Article
34 were enforced until the election was over.
93
3. Value of Variational Decisions
The two exemplary cases discussed in Sections 1 and 2 infra
both involve politically sensitive issues. The dictatorial
government in Korea enacted the National Security Act, effective
during the 1960s-1980s, which acted as a form of "Korean
McCarthyism" by disposing of political rivals by labeling them as
communists.94 It was misused by the military regime as a legal
basis to justify surveillance and suppression of democratic groups
88. Id.
89. See S. KOREA CONST. arts. 51-65.
90. See e.g., Congressman Election Act, art. 33 (2) (1988) (S. Korea) (affecting arts.
197 and 198).
91. Korean Const. Ct., Res. of Sept. 8, 1989,88 KCC Ga 6.
92. Id.
93. See id.
94. See generally Kyu Ho Youm, Press Freedom and Judicial Review in South Korea,
30 STAN. J. INT'L L. 1, 28 (1994).
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and their activities.95 Articles 33 and 34 of the Congress Election
Act, discussed in Section 2, above, involved extremely politically
sensitive issues. The articles restricted nonpartisan candidacy with
excessively large trust fund deposit requirements. 96 Despite the
criticisms of these variational decisions, the Korean Constitutional
Court used variational decisions in both cases to avoid a
constitutional crisis. 97
The Court used variational decisions for a variety of reasons.
First, the Court employed variational decisions in order to respect
the dignity and power of Congress as a law-making and law-
revising organ in accordance with the constitutional principle of
separation of power.98 Employing Decisions of Disagreement
with the Constitution and Decisions of Urging Legislation allows
harmony and unification in constitutional interpretation by giving
Congress an opportunity to revise laws, rather than nullifying
them.99 Consequently, the power to create law is maintained
where it constitutionally belongs-with the legislature. 100
Second, variational decisions are necessary to prevent a legal
vacuum, which can result from a complete and sudden abrogation
of a law. Thus, variational decisions efficiently preserve legal
stability 10 1 by allowing the Court to preserve the constitutional
parts of a law, while at the same time eliminating those sections
that are in violation.10 2
Third, the Court, using the theory of the Decisions of Limited
Constitutionality, asserts that constitutional analysis should begin
with the presumption that all laws are constitutional. 10
3
95. Id. at 29-30; see also James M. West, Martial Lawlessness: The Legal Aftermath of
Kwangju, 6 PAC. RIM L. & POL'Y J. 85, 140-41 (1997).
96. Korean Const. Ct., Res. of Sept. 8, 1984, 1 KCCR 199.
97. See Korean Const. Ct., Res. of Apr. 2, 1990, 89 KCC Ga 113; see also Korean
Const. Ct., Res. of Sept. 8, 1984, 1 KCCR 199.
98. S. KOREA CONST. arts. 51-65; see also Korean Const. Ct., Res. of Sept. 8, 1989,
KCC Ga 6, at 259. The Court stated, "This is to pay regard to the dignity of the Congress
and guarantee its essential function as the organ of representation. It is compatible with
the constitutional principle of separation of power that the repeal and revision of a law is
done by the legislative power as a general rule." (Translation by Jibong Lim.) Id
99. Korean Const. Ct., Res. of Sept. 8, 1989, KCC Ga 6, at 260. By employing
variational decisions "the Court can finally get the unified and harmonious interpretation
that is appropriate to the nature of the constitutional adjudication." Translation by Jibong
Lim.) Id.
100. S. Korea Const. arts. 51-65.
101. KWON,supra note 19, at 1166-67.
102. See id. at 1094.
103. See Korean Const. Ct., Res. of Feb. 25, 1992.89 KCC Ga 104, at 104.
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Accordingly, laws should be preserved, if possible.04 If the
language employed in a law is ambiguous, the Court should
interpret it in a way that avoids nullifying the law.'0 5  In the
application of a Decision of Limited Constitutionality, the Court
should balance the effect of completely invalidating a law versus
using a variational decision. The Court should only use a
variational decision if the disadvantage from complete abrogation
outweighs its advantage.
Fourth, variational decisions are used in cases involving
politically or economically sensitive issues. Allowing the Court to
render a variational decision gives it the opportunity to avoid a
drastic extreme-killing a law. While invalidating a law may be
advantageous to some political or economic interests, it may, on
the other hand, frustrate other interests. Consequently, the
interest groups negatively affected by the decision often become
antagonistic toward the Court, undermining its already precarious
authority. Furthermore, these hostile interest groups could forge
alliances with government officials already displeased with the
Court's judicial activism and ultimately threaten the Court's
future.
To encourage the development of the Court's constitutional
jurisprudence and secure its existence, variational decisions must
be allowed. Since the Court has only been in existence for
fourteen years, allowing flexibility in constitutional decision-
making increases the chances that the Court will exist long enough
to solidify its authority.
B. Constitutional Court Procedure
1. Overview
The Korean Constitution adopted a variation of the German
constitutional complaint system. 10 6 Article 68, Section 1, of the
Korean Constitutional Court Act allows a person to file a
complaint in the Korean Constitutional Court when a public
authority infringes upon that person's constitutional rights.
10 7
Despite protests by many Korean constitutional scholars, the
104. See id.
105. See id.
106. S. Korean Const. art. 111, § 1 (5).
107. Korean Const. Court Act art. 68, § 1.
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Korean variation of the constitutional complaint system, unlike the
German model, does not allow reconsideration of any court
decision that was based on the Constitution. 10 8 This rule is unfair
and inefficient. For example, a person injured by an
administrative agency's acts would be barred from filing a
complaint if a court has already ruled on the agency's act in
another matter. Furthermore, the bar on reviewing constitutional
decisions creates conflict between the general courts, the Supreme
Court and the Constitutional Court because constitutional
decisions rendered by the general courts are not reviewable by any
court of higher jurisdiction. 
109
The remaining elements of the constitutional complaint
system are nearly the same as those of Germany. For instance, in
both countries a complainant must exhaust all available judicial
remedies before filing a constitutional complaint.110 Likewise, the
Korean Constitutional Court requires a showing of self-
relatedness, directness and presentness of the infringed right
before a constitutional complaint may be filed.111 In both
countries, a short statute of limitations is set on claims to
encourage legal certainty. The limitations period begins running
at the time the individual realizes the infringement, and lasts sixty
days in Korea and one month in Germany. 112
108. Korean Const. Court Act art. 68, § 2. One difference between filing a
constitutional complaint in Germany and Korea is that a German constitutional complaint
may be filed to challenge a particular court decision. Volker Frey, Characteristic Features
of German Criminal Proceedings-An Alternative to the Criminal Procedure Law of the
Untied States?, 21 LoY. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 591, 595 (1999).
109. Choi, supra note 6, at 106, 115-16 (1993). It is said that such a abnormal
provisional exemption was enacted through the Supreme Court's lobby to the legislators,
see id. at 112-13.
110. See ABRAHAM, supra note 43, at 180; Korean Const. Court Act, art. 68, § 1. Art.
68 of the Constitutional Court Act allows the Constitutional Court to follow the doctrine
of exhaustion of other judicial remedies. Id. In the United States, the doctrine appears to
be adopted in state court level. "[T~he state court of last resort has jurisdiction in a
particular action, provided that all remedies have been duly exhausted." ABRAHAM, supra
note 43, at 180.
111. Wolfgang Zeidler, The Federal Constitutional Court of the Federal Republic of
Germany: Decisions on the Constitutionality of Legal Norms, 62 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
501, 506 (1987).
112. Korean Const. Court Act, art. 69 (requiring the complainant to file the
constitutional complaint within sixty days after knowledge of the infringement).
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2. Challenge to the Judicial Scriveners Act
Article 4, Section 1(2) of the Judicial Scrivener's Act provided
that the qualifying examination to be a judicial scrivener
(Scrivener's Examination) was to be administered by the Korean
Supreme Court at regular intervals. 113 The Act also provided that
the Supreme Court had jurisdiction over its enforcement. 114 In
spite of these provisions, the enforcement regulation left the
decision to the discretion of the Chief of the Office of Court
Administration (COCA) to determine whether and when to hold
the examination.
115
The Korean Constitutional Court reviewed the
constitutionality of the Judicial Scrivener's Act in 1990.116 An
applicant to the Scrivener's Examination filed a constitutional
complaint against COCA. The complaint alleged that the
delegation of power in the enforcement regulation of the Act
violated the applicant's rights of equal protection and freedom of
occupation. 117 The applicant's complaint alleged that the right to
take the Scrivener's Examination, granted in Article 4, Section
1(2) of the Act, was superior to the Act's enforcement
regulation. 118 In essence, the applicant argued that the power of
Supreme Court was superior to COCA.
In a previous adjudication, COCA held that the applicant's
argument was defective because it violated Article 3, Section 1 of
the enforcement regulation, which gave the power to review the
constitutionality of decrees, regulations or actions to the Supreme
Court. 119 COCA's interpretation allowed for the delegation of the
Scrivener's Examination to COCA. Furthermore, COCA held
that under Article 107, Section 2, of the Korean Constitution, the
Constitutional Court only had review power when the
constitutionality or legality of administrative decrees, regulations
or actions was at issue.
120
The Constitutional Court did not agree with this
interpretation. Instead the Court interpreted Article 107, Section
113. Judicial Scrivener's Act, art. 4 (Apr. 3, 1954) (S. Korea).
114. Id at art. 3, § 1.
115. Id. at art. 4.
116. Korean Const. Ct., Dec. of Oct. 15, 1990,89 KCC Ma 178.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. S. KOREAN CONST. art. 107, § 2.
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2 to mean that in a case where the constitutionality of a decree or
regulation is a prerequisite to a judgment, the Supreme Court can
review its constitutionality without having it certified by the
Constitutional Court. 121 The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court,
however, is not exclusive. Because Article 111, Section 1(1)122 of
the Constitution gives the power to review the constitutionality of
a law to the Constitutional Court, it follows that the jurisdiction
for judicial review of decrees and regulations, which are
subordinate laws, extend also to the Constitutional Court. This
coexistent jurisdiction is especially relevant to constitutional
complaints premised on the infringement of fundamental civil
rights by the government.123 COCA erred when it found that the
Constitution limited the Constitutional Court's jurisdiction to hear
disputes to only laws that may be constitutional violations.124
Hence, constitutional complaints involving decrees, regulations or
actions that infringe on a basic civil right are not limited to the
Supreme Court's jurisdiction.
C. Jurisdictional Disputes among Governmental Agencies
In February 1995, the Constitutional Court decided its first
case involving a jurisdictional dispute between the Chairman of
the Congress and the members of Congress. 125 The facts of the
case stated that, on July 14, 1990, the House held its 150th plenary
session with all 245 congresspersons in attendance. 126 The Vice
Chairman, acting as proxy for the Chairman, declared the opening
of the session and presented twenty-six bills en bloc.127 He
announced his intention to alternate the presentation of
investigation reports and oral proposals with printed matters.128
The Vice Chairman stated he would pass a resolution with
numbers one through twenty-three as the report and proposal, and
numbers twenty-four and twenty-five as revised, for the other
parts as the original bill.129 He then asked if there were any
121. 2 Korean Const. Ct. 365, 89 Hun Ma 178 (1990).
122. S. KOREAN CONST. art 111, § 1 (prescribing that the Constitutional Court shall
adjudicate the unconstitutionality of law upon the request of the courts).
123. 2 Korean Const. Ct. 365, 89 Hun Ma 178 (1990).
124. Id.
125. Korean Const. Ct., Dec. of Feb. 23, 1995, 90 KCC Ra 1.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id.
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objections. 130 As soon as a Congress member from the majority
party answered that there were no objections, the Vice Chairman
proclaimed the passage of the bills, and the meeting was
adjourned. 1
31
The Congresspersons applied for a decision of jurisdictional
dispute against the Chairman of the House on September 12,
1990.132 In their suit, a coalition of Congress members from the
first opposition party and nonpartisan representatives alleged that
their right to participate in the 150th plenary session was violated
due to an irregular procedure in passing the bills.
133
In deciding the case, the Court first examined whether or not
members of the opposition party and nonpartisan representatives
had standing to bring the dispute.134 The Court focused on Article
111, Section 1, of the Constitution, which states, "The
Constitutional Court shall adjudicate the following
matters.. .disputes involving jurisdiction between national
agencies and local governments.' ' 135 The main objective of Article
111, Section 1 is to protect constitutional order by maintaining
checks and balances between political agencies. The Court
achieves this balance by defining the limits of power granted to
each agency. 136 Article 62, Section 1(1) specifically grants the
Court the power to resolve "jurisdictional dispute decisions
between the Congress, the Executive, the Judicature and the
Central Election Management Committee."'137  The Court
interpreted this to mean that they are granted jurisdiction to hear
disputes among only these bodies. 138 As a result, the Court could
not make a decision on whether other parties had standing to bring
a jurisdictional challenge.139
Consequently, governmental agencies that are not
enumerated in Article 62, Section (1), cannot be a party to a
jurisdictional dispute, even though they may exercise
130. Id.
131. Id.
132- Id.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. S. KOREA CONST. art. 111, § 1.
136. See Gavin Healy, Judicial Activism in the New Constitutional Court of Korea, 14
COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 213,213,219 (2000).
137. Constitutional Court Act, art. 62, § 1(1).
138. Korean Const. Ct., Dec. of Feb. 23, 1995,90 KCC Ra 1.
139. Id.
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governmental powers. Furthermore, disputes regarding
jurisdiction within the enumerated agencies are not within the
jurisdiction of the Constitutional Court. As a result, Congress may
only be a party to a jurisdictional dispute between itself and either
the Executive, Judicature or the Central Management Committee.
Members of Congress individually or in a group, as a negotiating
body, do not have the power to file jurisdictional complaints in
their individual capacities, even if several members file suit as a
group.
Alternatively, the coalition argued that, like the Chairman of
the Congress, Congresspersons' grant of power is expressly
provided for in the Constitution and the House Act; thus, they can
properly bring a jurisdictional complaint in their individual
capacities. 140 The Court determined, however, that various rights,
including the right to discuss and vote on legislation, are granted to
members of Congress in the course of the legislative process only
and individual opinions of a member of Congress do not represent
the opinion of Congress itself.141 Accordingly, the Court
concluded that members of Congress, whether individually or as a
negotiating body, do not have standing to bring a jurisdictional
challenge.142
Finally, while Article 111, Section 1, of the Constitution
empowers the Court to initiate impeachment proceedings and to
dissolve political parties,143 the Constitutional Court's narrow
interpretation of Article 62, Section (1) reduced the eligibility of
those who could have standing to bring a jurisdictional dispute
under the Constitution.
IV. THE FUTURE OF THE KOREAN CONSTITUTIONAL COURT
Due to its historically weak foundation, the Constitutional
Court's existence is in jeopardy. Yet, the court's role in the Korean
legal system is just beginning to develop. In light of its significant
role in protecting the constitutional rights of the Korean people,
the Court should not be abandoned. Instead, efforts should be
directed at solving the perceived problems of the Court.
140. Id.
141. Id. (citing to Korean Const. Ct. Res. of Feb. 23, 1995, 90 KCC Ra 1).
142. Id.
143. See S. KOREA CONST. art. 111, §§ 1(2)-(3).
[Vol. 24:327
Korean Constitutional Court
A. Issues Affecting the Future of the Korean Constitutional Court
1. The Korean Government Does Not Have a Division of Power
Between National and Local Government
a. Overview
Korea's political system is a unitary system of government,
meaning one political body holds all national ruling power, and its
court system is unitary as well. 144 Theoretically, each court can set
national legal policy. Thus, courts are not confronted with the
need to harmonize conflicting constitutional interpretations or
disparate enforcement of local laws. This system is considerably
different from the U.S. and German legal systems upon which the
Korean Constitutional Court is modeled.
The U.S. and German high courts have developed as arbiters
in disputes between federal and state governments. 145 Since that
function is not required of the Constitutional Court in Korea, the
need for the court has faced significant challenges, which are
difficult to combat.
146
b. United States Court System
The U.S. Supreme Court is the final adjudicator for disputes
affecting the relationship between federal and state governments.
This role has been exemplified in Court decisions based on the
Doctrine of Federalism, which holds that certain legislative
functions are reserved specifically to the States. This doctrine has
developed mainly through the Supreme Court's interpretation of
the commerce clause, necessary and proper clause and supremacy
clause of the U.S. Constitution. 147 These constitutional clauses
simultaneously grant expansive federal powers and place
144. See Healey, supra note 136, at 225.
145. See generally, Jibong Lim, A Comparative Study of the Constitutional Adjudication
Systems of the U.S., Germany and Korea, 6 TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L. 123, 125-33 (1999)
(citing Brown v. Maryland, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat) 419 (1827); Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9
Wheat) 316 (1824); McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 316 (1819).).
146. See generally JOHN R. SCHMIDHAUSER, THE SUPREME COURT As FINAL
ARBITER IN FEDERAL-STATE RELATIONS 1789-1957 (1958) (describing the history of
U.S. Supreme Court as a final arbiter between federal and state government).
147. See Lim, supra note 145, at 126 (discussing Brown, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat) 419;
Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat) 316; McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 316).
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restrictions on those powers. 148 Numerous Supreme Court
decisions have interpreted the Constitution in a way that
specifically demarcate federal and state powers.149 Both the
county's history and its changing political climate are reflected in
such decisions. 150
The Supreme Court's Federalism decisions have followed two
patterns. At first, the Supreme Court expanded federal powers by
broadly interpreting the language of Article 1, Section 8, Clause 3
of the U.S. Constitution (also known as the "Commerce
Clause"). 15
1
Currently, Supreme Court decisions seek to halt the
expansion of any new federal powers, while also narrowing the
scope of powers previously granted. This curtailment of federal
powers is especially true with regard to the power of Congress.
Supreme Court decisions based on Federalism rely heavily on the
sovereignty of the States as described in the Tenth Amendment.
152
Ironically, the earliest constructions of the Commerce Clause
followed this interpretation. In Wilson v. Black Bird Creek Marsh
Co., Chief Justice Marshall interpreted a Delaware State statute to
allow the state law to have an effect on interstate commerce, which
has traditionally been controlled by federal power. Marshall
found that the Delaware law did not exceed the state's authority,
as long as the law only affected commerce through an incidental
consequence of the state's exercise of its "police powers."
153
Today, the Supreme Court, led by Chief Justice Rehnquist, is
returning to this view, resulting in a broader grant of state power
and a simultaneous narrowing of federal power. 154 Therefore, the
148. Id.
149. Id; see aLso JOSEPH F. ZIMMERMAN, CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN
FEDERALISM-THE GROWTH OF NATIONAL POWER 82-102 (1992); WILLIAM B.
LOCKHART ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-CASES, COMMENTS, QUESTIONS 76-168 (7th
ed. 1991).
150. See Lim, supra note 145, at 126 (discussing Brown, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat) 419;
Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat) 316; McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 316).
151. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 316 (1819); Gibbons v. Ogden, 22
U.S. (9 Wheat) 1 (1824); The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557 (1870); NLRB v. Jones &
McLaughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937); and Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit
Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
152. See generally San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528; National League of
Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976); Katzenbach v. McClung 379 U.S. 294 (1964); Heart of
Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
153. See Wilson v. Black Bird Creek Marsh Co., 27 U.S. (1 Pet.) 245 (1829).
154. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
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U.S. Supreme Court is the final arbiter in relationships between
federal and state governments.
c. German Court System
German constitutional law (Grundgesetz) is also based on the
Doctrine of Federalism. The role of the German Federal
Constitutional Court is influenced by the doctrine of Federal
Government-Friendly, a doctrine that regulates Federalism.'
55
This unwritten doctrine requires the federal and state governments
to perform their specific constitutional duties, while also obligating
the states to cooperative relationships with the federal
government. 15
6
In addition to interpreting other types of Constitutional
issues, the German Constitutional Court adjudicates disputes over
the power of the federal and state governments. 157 The Court's
decisions are based on the text of the constitution and
interpretations of the language. 158 Its power to influence national
law, however, is not exclusive. Rather, the national legislative
power is shared among the German Constitutional Court, federal
government and state government. 159 With the permission of the
Constitutional Court, the German Senate (Senat) approves the
substance of laws affecting the States. 160 Administrative actions
and enforcement of federal law are duties entrusted to the
states.1 61 The power of the federal government is limited based on
"legal suitability.' 162
In sum, the German Federal Constitutional Court's power
over national policy is weaker than that of the U.S. Supreme
Court. Because Germany is smaller in both the number of states
and the physical territory it covers, the distribution of power
between the federal and state governments is not problematic.
155. See KONRAD HEESE, GRUNDZUGE DES VERFASSUNGSRECHTS DER
BUNDESREPUBLIK [Basic Principles of German Constitutional Law] 168 (Hee-Yol
Kay trans., Seoul: Sam-Young Sa, 1987).
156. Id.
157. Id. at 166-67.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 153-65
160. Id.
161. HESSE, supra note 155, at 166-67. For legal suitability, the federal law should be
interpreted in a harmonious way with state laws as much as possible without any
significant conflicts between them.
162. Id.
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The doctrine of Federal Government-Friendly also lessens the
conflict between the two legislative bodies.
d. Korean Court System
As mentioned infra, Korea is not a federal system but rather a
unitary legal system. Under the Korean unitary system the courts
are organized in three levels that are similar to the legal system in
Japan. 163  Each level has separate original jurisdictional and
appellate review powers.
The first level contains the district courts and family courts of
first instance. The courts are subdivided into single-judge and
collegiate trial divisions, which also include appellate divisions.16
4
The second level consists of high courts, which hear appeals de
novo from administrative agency decisions and from collegiate
divisions of district courts. 165 The third level is composed of the
Supreme Court, which hears appeals from high courts and
appellate divisions of district and family courts, and exceptional
appeals from courts of first instance.166 Because Korea has a
unitary legal court system, the Constitutional Court is not
concerned with federal-state conflicts.
Under the Korean legal system the main role of the
Constitutional Court is not to be a final arbiter in federal-state
conflicts, but to protect the individual constitutional rights of the
Korean people. As a result, the Korean Constitutional Court
plays a more limited and less powerful role in the Korean political
and legal systems. Unlike the high courts of other federal-state
countries, the Korean Constitutional Court does not make
decisions involving the power of the government. This distinction
effectively limits the legitimacy of the Korean Constitutional
Court and is an important reason why the Court's future is in
jeopardy.
2. Pressure from the Other Branches of Government
Other branches of government often threaten the Korean
Constitutional Court's existence. The absence of historical
precedent in case law often undermines the legitimacy of the
163. West & Yoon, supra note 1, at 76.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 67.
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Court's decisions. If the Korean Constitutional Court invalidates
legal norms created by Congress or administrative agencies, the
Court risks losing the support of those and other government
bodies. Compared to other high courts, the Korean Constitutional
Court is heavily impacted by political pressure.
A rare example of political influence over a Constitutional
Court occurred when United States President Franklin D.
Roosevelt tried to affect the decisions of the Supreme Court
regarding his "New Deal Policy." Roosevelt, along with a liberal
Democratic majority in Congress, enacted a series of new social
programs to stimulate the economy. 167 The Supreme Court struck
the programs, ruling that Congress had exceeded the limits of its
Commerce powers.
168
Frustrated by his inability to implement the New Deal
programs, Roosevelt devised a "court packing" scheme to change
the makeup of the Court and make it more favorable to his
policies.' 69 Roosevelt sent a bill to Congress that would have
allowed him to appoint an additional justice to the Supreme Court
for every sitting justice who was over seventy years of age.170 He
reasoned, at least publicly, that the Court was overloaded and
needed the additional justices to keep up with its heavy
caseload.171 Before Congress voted on the bill, the Supreme Court
upheld both state and federal New Deal regulations in two
surprising decisions.
172
Another example of political pressure on a constitutional
court occurred in Nazi Germany.173 While in control, Adolf Hitler
exercised almost unlimited power over the composition of the
Judiciary, including the appointment of the justices and the length
of their terms. 174 Not surprisingly, judges who did not comply with
Hitler's prerogatives were expelled from the judiciary.175 As a
167. See Ellis Katz, The U.S. Supreme Court and the Integration of American
Federalism, FEDERALISM AND SUPREME COURTS 35, 42 (Edmond Orban & Bruylan
Bruxelles eds., 1991).
168. Id. at 40-44.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 42.
171. Id. at 42-43.
172. See NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, (1937); West Coast Hotel
Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
173. See INGO MULLER, HITLER'S JUSTICE: THE COURTS OF THE THIRD REICH 293-
94 (Deborah Lucas Schneidef trans., Harvard Univ. Press 1991).
174. Id. at 294.
175. Id.
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result, the Court acted as a subordinate agency to validate the laws
and regulations of Hitler, not as an independent body charged with
the duty of protecting fundamental individual rights.
176
Legal precedent also restricted the Justices' ability to reverse
laws implemented by the Nazi regime. The Weimar Court was
unwilling to punish Nazis, including Hitler, because of the political
Nazi principle, "whatever benefits the people is right."'1 77 Five
years before the Nazis seized power, the highest courts in the land
had adopted this as a legal principle.
178
The political theory of legal positivism also influenced the
German Justices during this period.179 Legal positivism requires
judges to separate law and morality when reaching decisions.
Hiding behind this theory, judges were able to rationalize and
validate the inhumane and unjust Nazi laws.
180
In Korea, political influence over the Judiciary has an even
more damning effect than the examples discussed above. During
the tenure of The Third Republic, the Korean Constitutional
Court had judicial review powers resembling the power granted to
the U.S. Supreme Court. The Korean Constitution also provided
that the President could appoint Supreme Court Justices, as long
as a justice completed his guaranteed six-year tenure and the Chief
Justice received approval from a majority of the Council for the
Recommendation of Justices.
181
Pursuant to its grant of power in the Constitution, the Court
accepted appellate review of the State Damage Redress Act of
1971. At issue was the constitutionality of Article 2, Section 1 of
the Act, which did not give public servicemen the right to legal
redress because they were eligible for compensation under
accident indemnities and survivor pension plans. 182 The Court's
ruling that the Act violated the Equal Protection Clause of the
Constitution led to the "Judiciary Crisis of 1970."183 The decision
expanded the scope of State liability.184 It was the only time a
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. S. KOREAN CONST. art. 99, § 2 (Third Republic).
182. State Damage Redress Act, art. 2, § 1 (1971) (S. Korea).
183. Korean Supreme Ct., Dec. of June 22, 1971, 70 Da 1010.
184. Id.
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legislative act was held unconstitutional in the ten years of the
Court's operation.
President Park's anger at the Court's action pressured many
justices into retirement, leading to more than half of the Justices
being replaced. 185 This political influence by the President could
have resulted in making judges reluctant to hold a law
unconstitutional. As a result of the court's decision, judicial
independence no longer exists in Korea. Due to his fear of more
assertive courts in the future, President Park removed the final
authority of judicial review from the courts, passing a new
Constitution the following year.
186
3. Power Struggle with the Korean Supreme Court
Conflicts over the Constitutional Court's power occurred not
only with the other branches of government, but also within the
Korean Judicature, as the Constitutional Court is separate from
the general courts.187 Prior to the creation of the Constitutional
Court the Supreme Court was the highest court of the Judicature.
188 When the Constitutional Court was assembled, the power of
the Supreme Court was reduced.
The existence of the two courts created a power struggle.
Each court insisted it had the final power to review legal norms. 189
Due to this conflict, Korea faced the need to establish rules
defining the jurisdiction of each court. The challenge to the
Judicial Scrivener exam, discussed in Section III above, was one
case that clarified the scope of the Supreme Court's jurisdiction.
This case held that while the power of final judicial review is with
the Korean Constitutional Court, the power to make decisions
regarding administrative rules and orders belongs to the Korean
Supreme Court.190 The decision to separate the power of judicial
review, established in this case, resulted in discord among the
Korean Judicature and threatened the status of the Constitutional
Court.191
185. CHANG-MIN LEE, SEOSOMOONESEO SEOCHODONG GGAJI [FROM SEOSOMOON
TO SEOCHODONG] 191-96 (Seoul: Hankook-Ilbo Publishing Co. 1993).
186. See S. KOREAN CONST. art. 99, § 2 (Third Republic).
187. See id.
188. West & Yoon, supra note 1, at 81.
189. See generally Moon-Hyun Kim, supra note 6, at 79.
190. Korean Const. Ct., Dec. of Oct. 15, 1990, 89 KCC Ma 178.
191. Id.
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Further complicating the relationship between the Korean
Constitutional Court and Supreme Court is the authority of the
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court to nominate three justices to
the Constitutional Court.192 The Supreme Court also controls the
administration of promotions and transfers of judges at the lower
levels of the judiciary. 193 Further, the Supreme Court supervises
the Judicial Research and Training Institute, an institution with a
statutory monopoly over advanced practical training of all Korean
judges, prosecutors and licensed lawyers.
194
This has led many judges to regard the Korean Supreme
Court as being the more powerful court, although the
Constitutional Court arguably has broader jurisdiction to render
decisions. 195  The Constitutional Court's powers have been
described as "comparable to those of other Korean national
authorities with the highest level of governmental authority."
196
Hence, the Chief Justice of the Constitutional Court is not
subordinate to the leaders of other branches of the judiciary or
government. Realistically though, the Constitutional Court has
few allies within the judicial branch or among the powerful
agencies of the executive branch.197 Consequently, Korean
bureaucrats, along with the majority of judges and prosecutors,
continue to regard the Korean Supreme Court as more significant
than the Korean Constitutional Court.
198
B. Proposals for the Stable and Continuous Development of the
Korean Constitutional Court
As discussed above, the Korean Constitutional Court adopted
many attributes of both the German and U.S. high court systems.
Accordingly, the Court's organization and empowerment are
similar to that of the high courts in Germany and the United
States. Additionally, the courts of all three countries experience
the threat of political influences.
192. West & Yoon, supra note 1, at 81.
193. Id.
194. See id. at 77-82 (describing the position of maximalist and minimalist assessments
of the role of the Constitutional Court).
195. See id. at 82.
196. Id. at 81.
197. West & Yoon, supra note 1, at 81.
198. Id.
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The role of constitutional adjudication in Korea, however, is
different than in Germany and the United States. Because Korea
has a unitary legal system, the Constitutional Court's decisions
have limited significance. While the U.S. Supreme Court and
German Constitutional Court are the final arbiters in federal-state
relations, the Korean Constitutional Court only can render
decisions regarding the constitutional rights of individuals. Hence,
proposals for reform must be made with an eye toward this sole
function of the Korean Constitutional Court.
First, while there are several possible solutions to some of the
problems of the Korean Constitutional Court, those who bring
reform proposals must keep in mind that the Court will never have
the power of a federalist court system. Ultimately, this will always
limit the power of the Court. During future reforms of the
Constitutional Court system, more care should be exercised before
adopting attributes of other national legal systems. The adoption
of the current Constitutional Court was done recklessly, without
considering if it was suitable for a unitary legal system.
Second, implementing variational decisions for use during
concrete judicial review can lessen the antagonism of other
government branches. For instance, the Decision of Limited
Constitutionality enables the Constitutional Court to avoid
completely nullifying a law by reading the law to restrictively
conform to the Constitution. Additionally, Decisions of
Disagreement with the Constitution allow judges to acknowledge
the temporary force of a law to prevent a legal vacuum and chaos,
despite the admission of the law's unconstitutionality. Moreover,
the Decision of Urging Legislation warns Congress that even
though the law at issue is constitutional at this time, it is likely to
be unconstitutional in the future.
In sum, variational decisions give Congress and the Executive
time to revise laws and regulations to comply with the
Constitution. This allows the Court to make decisions while still
recognizing and respecting the independence of the other branches
of government.
Furthermore, variational decisions protect the Court from
public hostility. Constitutional adjudication often involves
sensitive political and economic interests. Without the ability to
render variational decisions, the Constitutional Court would be
limited to the two extremes of either finding a law constitutional or
nullifying the law as unconstitutional. There will always be
disagreement regarding the Court's decision. Limited to only two
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types of decisions, the Court will continue to polarize the country
because every decision would necessarily deny an interest while
supporting another interest. When a group's political or economic
interests are denied, the group will grow antipathetic toward the
Constitutional Court and ultimately may withdraw support
altogether. Moreover, the disenfranchised groups will align
together to challenge the validity of the Court. This could be fatal
to the existence of the Constitutional Court. Thus, variational
decisions enable the Constitutional Court to circumvent
potentially disastrous public attacks.
Third, reform efforts should aggressively address the Court's
jurisdictional conflicts with the Supreme Court. During the Third
Republic, the Supreme Court had broad powers of judicial review.
Because the power of review was vested in the general courts,
there was hope that the courts' would harmonize constitutional
doctrine. 199 The results, however, fell short of expectations. 200 Due
to fear of politicizing the judiciary, the Supreme Court maintained
a policy of judicial restraint and frequently reversed the lower
court's holdings. One can argue that the Supreme Court was
negligent in performing its duties at this time.
The Constitutional Court, in contrast, strongly exerts its
powers, as directed by the Constitution. The Court tries to strike a
balance between the need to avoid politicization of the court and
the need for uniform constitutional adjudication, a function
abandoned by the Supreme Court under the previous legal system.
The Supreme Court should support these efforts.
Finally, because of the nature of constitutional adjudication,
with its unique background, principles and techniques, it is prudent
to distinguish it from other fields of adjudication. As is done in the
German legal system, the Constitutional Court should be given
exclusive jurisdiction over constitutional questions, including
review of administrative rules and orders, rather than sharing the
power with the general courts. This would eliminate further
disagreement among the courts as to which court can make
constitutional decisions, and would also serve to harmonize
constitutional interpretation.
199. Yoon, New Developments, supra note 23, at 407.
200. Id. at 404-06.
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V. CONCLUSION
The Korean Constitutional Court has greatly contributed to
changing the citizens' perception of the Constitution and
government. The Court publicly scrutinizes powers that previously
seemed to go unchecked. The new role of the Court is the result of
a revamped legal system and a modern form of judicial activism.
Previously, authoritarian politics and lack of constitutional
decisions limited constitutional scholarship to mere dogmatism.
Now, lively discussions of constitutional issues have brought new
life to Korean public law. Constitutional decisions have become
one of the most important sources of this law.
The Korean Constitutional Court is performing a great
service for Korean society. By protecting individual rights,
scrutinizing law enforcement and demystifying constitutional
theories, the Court is becoming an important element of Korean
society, and thus, it should be protected from attacks by other
government branches and hostile groups. Legal and institutional
mechanisms that secure its existence and continuous development
must be developed immediately.
2002] 359

